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Abstract 
This work was motivated mainly by the need to empirically examine the magnitude of economic loss attributed 
to informality in Nigeria. Specifically, the objective of the study is to examine the size, development, and causes 
of the informal sector of the Nigerian economy. In recent times, multiple indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) 
models are applied to time series estimating the size and development of the informal economy for a particular 
country. However, in order to obtain more accurate estimates about the size, development and causes of the 
informal economy in Nigeria, this work applied an error correction MIMIC (EMIMIC) model which estimates 
the cointegration equilibrium relationship and the error correction short run dynamics. The results show that 
since 1970, the size of the informal economy has hovered between 53.6 – 77.2% of GDP, and that the average 
size of the informal economy was about 64.6% of GDP. Specifically, the results indicate that informal sector was 
about three-quarters of GDP in 2010. Furthermore, the results show that unemployment, tax burden, government 
regulation, and inflation are the most important drivers of informality in Nigeria. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the major constraints to development policymaking and economic management in Nigeria is the paucity 
of credible statistics and systematic evidence on the informal sector. Despite the wide range of informal sector 
economic processes and activities, current knowledge of the size, causes, characteristics, and dynamics of the 
informal sector remains very scanty and inadequate (Oduh et al, 2008). However, improved knowledge and 
understanding of the nature, size, causes and dynamics of the informal sector will provide salient evidence base 
for more effective targeting of economic policy and control measures.  
Economic activity that falls outside the purview of government accounting is known by various names as 
informal, hidden, underground, black, gray, clandestine, illegal, shadow, and parallel (Thomas, 1992; Feige, 
1990; Schneider and Enste, 2000). According to Tanzi (1999), “there cannot be any question that the informal 
economy is a real phenomenon with important implications that deserve attention and study”. Of greatest 
concern is that this activity is unrecorded, and, as such, official national income accounts statistics do not 
accurately represent the true state of the country’s economy. Given that these statistics are employed to generate 
economic policies, unavailability of information on the size of the informal sector and its causes may lead to 
inappropriate policy responses.  
Furthermore, Ajakaiye and Akerele (1996) and Oduh et al (2008) stated that Nigeria’s informal economy still 
remains an enigma as it has neither been comprehensively studied nor understood. Clearly, several questions 
remain unanswered regarding the size, causes, and dynamics of the informal sector in Nigeria; and providing 
answers to these questions through scientific analysis represents a viable approach to supporting economic 
policies for integrating formal and informal sectors and eliminating dualistic markets. 
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Herein lies the motivation for this study which examined the magnitude, causes, and dynamics of the informal 
sector of the Nigerian economy over the period 1970 to 2010.  
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
Studies trying to measure the informal sector first of all face the difficulty of how to define it. Unfortunately, the 
informal sector does not have a commonly accepted definition in literature (Oduh et al, 2008; Ajakaiye and 
Akerele, 1996; Thomas, 1992). It has been difficult to evolve a conceptual framework which can be applied to 
precisely decide whether a particular activity is formal or informal. Unfortunately, without a precise and 
unambiguous conceptual framework for demarcating the boundaries between formal and informal activities, 
systematic research into the salient features of informal activities in ways that will enhance knowledge about this 
phenomenon may be difficult (Ajakaiye and Akerele, 1996).  
 
In general, however, the informal sector has been defined in the literature from several dominant perspectives, 
namely: government regulations, social security, the number of people employed in an enterprise, physical and 
human capital per worker, mode of operation of the enterprise (such as customer base and location of the 
enterprise), source of income, and legal framework. From the perspective of government regulations, Oduh et al 
(2008) defined an informal enterprise as one which operates without regulations prescribed by the public 
authority to govern its organizational behavior. This definition suggests that informal economic units operate 
without the constraints of behavior prescribed by public authorities that may include the regulation of prices of 
inputs, control of entry in the sector, disclosure of production process information, safety and health standards. 
However, an informal economic unit may have its internal rules and regulations which may not be available to 
the public, yet the existence of such internal rules of behaviour does not confer on it the status of a formal 
enterprise. 
Gbanador (2007) views informal sector activities from two perspectives. According to this approach, the 
underground (informal) economy is made up of two components, viz: 
i. the production and distribution of illegal goods and services; and 
ii. the non reporting of legal economic activities. 
Other definitions of the informal sector can be found in Feige (1990), Loayza (1997), Henley et al (2006), 
Schneider (2002), Smith (1994), Bhattacharyya (1999), Hart (1973), and Ajakaiye and Akerele (1996).  
In this empirical study, we shall adopt the conceptualization of the informal economy provided by Oduh et al 
(2008), which considered that one of the main features of Nigerian informal enterprises is that they are not 
legally independent from the households that own/manage them. Besides, these enterprises are characterized by 
small number of employees (less than 10 employees) and typically operate outside the regulatory capture (that is, 
not registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission as a separate legal entity and so do not subscribe to both 
corporate income tax and Pay-As-You-Earn tax). 
 
3. The Nigerian Informal Sector 
Akerele (2005) reported that before and years after independence, the Nigerian economy was predominantly 
rural and agrarian. Cash crops such as palm produce, ground nut, and cocoa as well as minerals such as tin ore, 
columbite, and zinc were major foreign exchange earners. These activities were carried out by individuals and 
small-holder enterprises. It is obvious that these activities were mainly performed by informal sector operators. 
The Nigerian informal economy covers a wide range of activities. These include several small-scale and 
unregistered sole-proprietor businesses, and in some instances, joint-partnership businesses which can be found 
in both rural and urban settlements across the country. In this informal economy, tax evasion is very rampant as 
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income is unmeasured and unrecorded. The nature of the economic activities engaged in varies considerably 
from one locality to another. For example, in the rural areas, farming activities and allied occupations such as 
blacksmithing, weaving, and pot making are more prevalent. However, in urban centres like Lagos, Enugu, and 
Abuja, the informal economic activities include trading, small-scale manufacturing and repairing industries, such 
as carpentry, upholstery, furniture making, woodworks, metalworks, bakery, tailoring, bricklaying, and printing. 
Those in the area of repairing occupations include, among others, the automobile mechanics, electricians, clock 
and watch repairers and cobblers (Olowu and Okotoni, 1996). 
 
4. Causes of the Informal Economy 
In economic literature, the most important causes of the informal economy are increased tax burden and social 
security contribution, the complexity of the tax system, increased regulation in the formal economy especially in 
labour markets, government failure, increasing unemployment rate, inflation rate, interest rate, forced reduction 
of weekly working hours, earlier retirement and declining tax morale (Schneider and Enste, 2004; Ogunc and 
Yilmaz, 2000; Oduh et al, 2008; Salisu, 2001).  
 
5. Review of the Empirical Literature 
One of the estimates of the informal economies around the world is the study conducted by Schneider (2007), 
who used the DYMIMIC and Currency Demand Methods to estimate the informal economies of 145 countries, 
including developing, transition, and highly developed OECD economies over the period 1999 to 2005. The 
findings reveal that the size of the informal economy (as a percent of “official” GDP) in 2004/05 in Nigeria is 
59.5%. Also, the average size of the informal economy in 2004/05 in 96 developing countries (including 
Nigeria) is 36.7%. Schneider also found that an increased burden of taxation and social security contributions, 
combined with a labour market regulation are the causes of the informal economy.  
Oduh et al (2008) used the general MIMIC model to estimate the size and determinants of the informal sector in 
Nigeria over the period 1970 to 2005. The study also used a survey methodology to obtain data on 
enterprise-level characteristics, production patterns, investment practices and business conditions from 4,455 
informal sector enterprises in eleven states in the South-South and South-East zones of Nigeria. Their study 
shows that since 1970, the size of the informal economy ranged between 44-73% of GDP; and that declining 
income, high tax burden, high black market premiums, and government control of the economy are some of the 
most important drivers of informality in Nigeria. Furthermore, wholesale, retail trade and personal services 
dominate the informal sector while financial intermediation is the least in terms of number of enterprises.  
Salisu (2001) utilised the MIMIC approach to estimate the size of the hidden economy in Nigeria. The study 
found that the informal economy was about 9.64 – 65.43% of GDP in the period 1960 to 1997 and that the size 
of the informal sector in 1997 was about 58.76% of GDP. 
 
6. Limitations of Previous Studies 
The literature above summarized the current estimates of the size and causes of the informal economy in Nigeria. 
Schneider (2007) used the direct and indirect methods of estimating the size and development of the informal 
economy despite the inherent weaknesses in these methods.  
Salisu (2001) and Oduh et al (2008) used the model approach (that is, the MIMIC model) together with the direct 
approach (survey method) to estimate the size of the Nigerian informal sector. However, while the MIMIC 
model developed by Oduh et al (2008) excluded the real GDP, inflation and interest rate, that of Salisu (2001) 
excluded both the real GDP and unemployment despite the fact that economic theory had identified 
unemployment as a major cause of informal activities in Nigeria. The MIMIC models developed by Oduh et al 
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(2008) and Salisu (2001) did not consider both the long run equilibrium relationships and the short run dynamic 
error corrections at the same time.  
Furthermore, the estimates Schneider (2007) reported for Nigeria used a panel with a dominant cross-sectional 
dimension (145 countries over a limited period of ten annual time points), thus any time dynamics and 
differences between long- and short-run effects cannot be taken into consideration. The Nigerian informal 
economy estimates of Schneider (2007) were obtained from cross-sectional data generally treating the analyzed 
countries as random observations; they paid little or no attention to country peculiarities as the estimates of the 
informal economy were not obtained from time series data for Nigeria. Oduh et al (2008) noted that one growing 
fact about the measurement and the size of the informal sector is that methods and data availability determine its 
level of accuracy. This study has the advantage of more data availability and most recent estimation technique, 
that is, the EMIMIC modeling technique developed by Buehn and Schneider (2008). 
 
7. METHODOLOGY 
Economists and statisticians around the world have developed a variety of methods for estimating the size of the 
informal economy. Oduh et al (2008) stated that these methods can be summarized into three approaches: 
Microeconomic, macroeconomic and the use of econometric models. 
Microeconomic approaches employ sample surveys based on voluntary replies or tax auditing and other 
compliance methods. The reliability of the surveys depends on a number of factors which range from 
methodology of sample designs to instruments of carrying out the survey. The disadvantages of this approach are 
connected with normal flaws that are associated with generating survey data including the precision of the 
questions, reliable responses, measurement errors, etc. They only result in point estimates and reveal little about 
increases in undeclared work. In fact, the responses are rarely reliable (Oduh et al, 2008; Schneider, 2002).  
The macroeconomic approaches, also called indicator or indirect approaches, make use of various economic and 
social indicators that provide information about the development of the informal economy over time (Schneider 
and Enste, 2004; Oduh et al, 2008). In contemporary literature, there are five indicators for gauging trends of the 
informal economy, namely: Gap between national expenditure and income statistics; Discrepancy between the 
official and actual labour force; Currency demand or the ratio of currency to demand deposits; Transaction 
approach; and Electricity consumption method. 
The main criticisms of this method as found in Thomas (1986,1999) and Feige (1986) are that not all informal 
transactions are performed in cash, it gives only a very rough indication of the informality, the same velocity of 
money in both the formal and informal economy, etc.  
The model approach explicitly considers multiple causes that lead to the existence and growth of the informal 
economy, and to its multiple effects over time. The empirical method is based on the statistical theory of 
unobserved variable, a theory which considers multiple causes and multiple indicators of the phenomenon to be 
measured. The pioneers of this approach are Weck (1983), and Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984), who applied 
this approach to cross-section data from the 24 OECD countries for various years.  
 
8. The General MIMIC Model 
The MIMIC model is an attempt at transcending the constraints found in the direct and indirect approaches. 
According to Buehn and Schneider (2008), the MIMIC model explains the relationship between observable 
variables and an unobservable variable by minimizing the distance between the sample covariance matrix and 
the covariance matrix predicted by the model. The observable variables are divided into causes of the latent 
variable and its indicators. The MIMIC model consists of two parts: the structural equation model and the 
measurement model. The structural equation model is given by:  
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      ηt = γ′xt + ς t ,    ………………………………………………..(1)  
 
Where:  xt = (x1t
 , x 2t
 ,…, x qt ) is a (1∗ q) vector of time series variables as indicated by the subscript t . Each 
time series xit , i = 1,2, …,q is a potential cause of the latent variable ηt .  γ′ = (γ1, γ 2 , …, γ q ) , is a (1∗ q) vector of 
coefficients in the structural model describing the "causal" relationships between the latent variable and its causes. Since the 
structural equation model only partially explains the latent variable ηt , the error term ςt represents the unexplained 
component. The MIMIC model assumes that the variables are measured as deviations from their means and that 
the error term does not correlate to the causes, that is:  
 
E(ηt ) = E(xt ) = E(ςt ) = 0 and E(xtς′t ) = E(ςt x′t ) = 0 . The variance of ςt is abbreviated by ψ while Φ is the (q ∗ q) covariance matrix 
of the causes xt .  
The measurement model represents the link between the latent variable and its indicators, that is, the latent 
unobservable variable is expressed in terms of observable variables. It is specified by:  
     yt = ληt + εt , …………………………………………………  (2)  
 
where:  yt = (y1t
 , y2t
 , …, ypt ) is a (1* p) vector of individual time series variables yjt , j = 1, 2, …, p. εt = (ε1t, 
ε2t
 , …, εpt ) is a (p ∗1) vector of disturbances where every ε jt , j = 1, 2, …, p is a white noise error term. Their (p ∗ p) covariance matrix 
is given by Θε . The single λ j , j = 1, 2, …, p in the (p ∗1) vector of regression coefficients λ , represents the magnitude of the 
expected change of the respective indicator for a unit change in the latent variable. Like the MIMIC model's 
causes, the indicators are directly measurable and expressed as deviations from their means, that is, E(yt) = E(εt ) = 
0 .  
Buehn and Schneider (2008) derived the MIMIC model’s covariance matrix, and considered the concepts of 
cointegration and error correction models extensively. They extended the general MIMIC model to include these 
concepts and as a result developed an error correction MIMIC (EMIMIC) model which comprises equations 3 and 4 
below:  
By putting equation (1) into equation (2), they obtained: 
 






 , ……………………………………………………(3)  
 
where: Π = λγ′ and zt = λζ t + εt . The error term zt in equation (3) is a (p ∗1) vector of linear combinations of the white noise 
error terms ςt and εt from the structural equation and the measurement model, that is, zt ~ (0,Ω ).  
 












 , ………………………………………………. (4)  
 
 
Where: ∆yt = y t − y t−1
 , ∆xt = xt − xt−1
 , zt−1
 = y t−1
 − Πxt−1
 , and Α , Β , and Κ are coefficient matrices in this 
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dynamic, short run model specification. Furthermore, in this specification Α = λα′ is the [p ∗ (q − r)] coefficient matrix of 
the first differences of the I(1) causes, and Β = λβ′ is the (p ∗ r) coefficient matrix of the I(0) causes. The matrix K = λκ′ is the (p ∗ 
p) coefficient matrix for the long run disequilibrium's error correction term and wt ~ (0,Ω ) is a white noise 
disturbance. 
 
8.1  Model Variables (Causes) 
The variables of this study were selected having in mind data constraints, the need to compare findings with the 
previous informal sector studies, the micro and macroeconomic environment peculiar to the Nigerian economy, 
and the need for the causal and indicator variables to correctly, precisely and comprehensively correspond to the 
intended semantic content of the latent variable. Therefore, we have chosen our cause variables to include: 
8.1.1 Tax Burden 
In the literature, the most popular determinants of tax evasion and of the informal economy are tax rates. The 
common hypothesis is that an increase of the tax burden is a strong incentive to work in the unofficial economy. 
The tax burden is measured by means of the total share of direct and indirect taxes as a percentage of GDP. The 
higher the tax burden the higher is the incentive to work in the informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
8.1.2 Real Government Consumption 
A rise in the size of the public sector, and/or the degree of regulation of the economic system, provides an 
incentive to enter the informal economy (Aigner et al. 1988). We have used real government consumption (in 
percent of GDP) as proxy of all State regulatory activities. A positive sign of this coefficient will support the 
hypothesis that ‘more State’ in the market, and subsequently an increase in regulation, gives an incentive to 
operate in the unofficial economy. 
8.1.3 Unemployment rate 
According to Tanzi (1999), the relationship between the informal economy and the unemployment rate is 
ambiguous. Buehn and Schneider (2008) explained that whether the unemployment variable exhibits a positive 
or negative relationship depends on income and substitution effect. Income losses due to unemployment reduce 
demand in the informal economy as well as the formal economy. A substitution takes place as unemployed 
workers turn to the informal economy where cheaper goods make it easier to countervail utility losses. This may 
stimulate additional demand there. If the income effect exceeds the substitution effect, a negative relationship 
develops. 
8.1.4 Inflation 
Inflation is one of the factors that we think should determine the demand for money in circulation and hence the 
informal economy. It can be seen as a proxy for macro stability. The Nigerian economy had faced high levels of 
inflation since 1970’s mainly due to high reliance on imports. This had affected the economy in various ways 
such as wiping out of small businesses and fostering black markets. Hence, following Giles (1999) the inflation 
rate is included to allow for the upward “creep” of tax brackets, and the associated incentive for taxpayers to 
engage in informal activities. The higher the inflation, the larger the expected size of the informal economy. 
8.1.5 Interest Rates 
Interest rates act as the cost of holding money in the form of cash. It is expected that a higher interest rate on 
bank deposits increases the opportunity cost of holding currency. Thus a rational expectation is that an increase 
in this rate will make economic agents hold less cash and opt for deposits while a lower rate will act as a 
disincentive to holding deposits. Ultimately, interest rates should have a negative effect on the currency in 
circulation outside of banks and hence the informal economy. In this study we shall use the average rate on time 
deposits. 
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8.1.6 Trade Openness 
Openness of the economy to international trade may encourage the importation of contra band goods which have 
to be smuggled into the economy thereby increasing the activities of the criminal segment of the informal 
economy. In the literature, trade openness has been measured as the ratio of total trade to GDP. It is expected 
that the more open the economy is the higher the size of the informal economy. A positive sign is therefore 
expected for this variable.  
8.2 Model Variables (Indicators) 
To mirror activities in the informal economy, we use the monetary aggregate M1 and real GDP index. The 
discussion about the real GDP variable is crucial to the problem of identification, as well as for the theoretical 
consequences it implies, mainly because it is chosen as variable of scale (or reference variable). Assigning a 
positive (or negative) unit value to this variable makes it easier to find out the relative magnitude of the other 
indicator variables. A priori, it is not possible to determine the nature of the relationship between this variable 
and the informal economy (see Buehn and Schneider, 2008).  
Transactions in the informal economy are typically carried out using cash or money that is drawn from a current 
account at a moment's notice. Dell’Anno and Solomon (2006) used the ratio M1/M2 as proxy for currency in 
circulation in their study to measure the size of the United States underground economy. However, in this study 
and in accordance with Giles and Tedds (2002) as well as Buehn and Schneider (2008), we used real currency in 
circulation (M1), and we expect a positive relationship between the informal economy and M1. 
 
9. Unit Root Tests 
The dataset for this study are secondary data covering 1970 to 2010 obtained from the Central Bank of Nigeria’s 
Statistical Bulletin and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The number of observations is 41. We began our 
empirical analysis by pre-testing the data. We conducted the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) unit root test and 
the results for all the variables are shown in Table 1 below: 
Table 1: ADF Unit Root Test Results 
Variable  Test Statistic 5% Critical Value Order of Integration 
Indicators:     
Real GDP (RGDP) -5.678 -3.544* I(1) 
M1 (MSS) -5.249 -3.548* I(2) 
Causes:     
Real Government 
Consumption (RGC) 
-3.776 -3.540** I(0) 
Inflation Rate (INFR) -6.458 -3.544* I(1) 
Interest Rate (INTR) -7.518 -3.544* I(1) 
Trade Openness (TOP) -9.063 -3.544* I(1) 
Tax Burden (TaxB) -6.000 -3.544* I(1) 
Unemployment Rate 
(UNEMR) 
-5.041 -3.544* I(1) 
Key: * Stationarity at 1%; ** Stationary at 5% 
The unit root test results in Table 4.1 show that all the variables are integrated of order one at 5% level of 
significance, except for RGC which is stationary at levels and MSS which is integrated of order two. Since most 
of the cause variables have the same order of integration with RGDP at 5% level of significance, there was need 
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for co-integration test. However, in the case of MSS, we have established that there is no cointegration 
relationship since none of the cause variables has the same order of integration with MSS.  
10. Analysis of Co-integration Between Causes and Indicators (RGDP): 
Firstly, the Johansen Tests for co-integration was conducted in line with Johansen (1988) and Johansen and 
Juselius (1990). This method detects the number of co-integrating vectors in non-stationary time series. The 
result of the test is presented in Tables 2 below: 
Table 2: Johansen Co-integration Test Between Causes and RGDP 
Maximum Rank Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value 
0 195.11 124.24 
1 111.80 94.15 
2 75.29 68.52 
3 51.22 47.21 
4 30.29 29.68 
5 15.92 15.41 
6 7.03 3.76 
 
From Table 4.2, it is observed that there is co-integration between RGDP and the cause variables; that is, there is 
a long run relationship between RGDP and the cause variables. This long run relationship is considered strong 
since co-integration is established at maximum rank of 6. 
We also employed the Engle and Granger two-step approach to reconfirm if the cause variables are indeed 
co-integrated with RGDP and therefore exhibit a valid error correction representation (Engle and Granger, 
1987). To do this, we estimate least square regressions with variables in levels, where the RGDP is the 
dependent variable and the cause variables are the independent variables. Thus, the regression equation is: 
RGDP = β1RGC + β2INFR + β3INTR + β4TOP +β5TAXB + β6UNEMR + U1.  
Since the variables are deviations from their means, no constant is included in this regression equation. The 
assumed co-integration relationship’s residual U1 is then analyzed using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test. If the cause variables are co-integrated with RGDP, we expect the ADF test to reject the null hypothesis of a 
unit root. The result of the ADF test is presented in Table 3 below: 
Table 3: ADF Unit Root Tests Result for Residual (U1): 
Variable  Test Statistic 5% Critical Value Order of Integration 
Resid1 (U1) -7.224 -3.540* I(0) 
Key: * Stationarity at 1%; ** Stationary at 5% 
 
The unit root test result in Table 4.3 indicates that U1 is stationary at levels both at 1% and 5% levels of 
significance. This reconfirms our earlier result that the cause variables are co-integrated with RGDP.  
 
11. MIMIC Models Estimation Results: 
In order to estimate not only the relative size of the parameters but also their levels, it is necessary to fix a scale 
for the unobservable latent variable. A convenient way to determine the relative magnitude of the variables is to 
set the coefficient of one of the measurement model’s indicator variables to non-zero. Following Buehn and 
Schneider (2008), we fixed the coefficient of the variable RGDP for both the long run and the short run MIMIC 
estimation. 
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The establishment of co-integration relationship between the cause variables and RGDP (an indicator variable) 
permits the estimation of a long run equilibrium MIMIC model for the size and development of the informal 
sector of the Nigerian economy according to equation (3). This is followed by the estimation of the short run 
MIMIC model of equation (4) employing first differences of all cause variables and indicator variables. 
However, the short run estimation also includes the long run error correction term U1. In estimating the 
EMIMIC models, we observed the problem of multicollinearity involving our trade openness (TOP) variable and 
other cause variables. We therefore excluded the TOP variable from the estimations. The long run equilibrium 
parameter estimates and primary test statistics as well as those for the short run model generated from LISREL 
9.1 software are presented in Table 4 below: 
Table 4: MIMIC Models and Parameter Estimates 
 Long Run MIMIC Model 
Coefficients 
Short  Run MIMIC Model 
Coefficients 
Causes    
Inflation Rate (INFR) -0.202 (-3.75)** 0.0357 (0.84) 
Interest rate (INTR) -0.125 (-0.48) 0.0337 (0.30) 
Tax burden (TaxB) 1.255 (3.20)** 0.0553 (0.50) 
Real Government Consumption (RGC) 0.193 (12.43)** 0.0051 (0.17) 
Unemployment Rate (UNEMR) -3.021 (-6.70)** 0.1542 (0.51) 
Residual1 (U1) - 0.0546 (1.54) 
Indicators   
Real GDP (RGDP) 1 1 
Money Supply, M1 (MSS) 5826.00 119357.62 
Statistics    
Chi-square 494.51 42.89 
Degrees of freedom 4 5 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 





) 0.983 0.834 
P-value for test of close fit(RMSEA<0.05) 0.0161 0.0000 
Notes: (1) ** Significance at 5% level. The values of t-statistics are reported in parenthesis; it is desirable that the 
absolute value of the t-statistics > 1.96 and fulfillment of this condition is marked with **.   
(2) The goodness of fit index GFI (R
2
) is the coefficient of determination and it ranges over the interval [0,1]; 1 = 
a perfect fit. 
(3) For P-value for test of close fit (RMSEA<0.05), a positive (+) sign points to a good fitting. The root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) is also a fit test that some authors argue is less sensitive to sample size 
than the above mentioned tests (see for example Schneider, 2007); its value varies between 0 and 1; by 
convention, there is good model fit if the RMSEA is less than or equal to 0.05. 
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The coefficients of inflation at long run and short long run are -0.202 and 0.0357 respectively. Also, it is 
observed that inflation was statistically significant in the long run while its short run value was not significant as 
revealed by its t-values of -3.75 and 0.84 respectively. This result shows that inflation is one of the factors that 
significantly cause the informal sector in Nigeria. The estimated coefficients have the theoretically expected 
signs particularly in the long run. The negative sign implies that an increase in the burden of inflation will drive 
economic agents into the informal sector, and this is in agreement with the findings of Salisu (2001). 
11.2 Interest rate 
Interest rate both at long run and short long run displays the coefficients of -0.125 and 0.0337 respectively. The 
estimated coefficients have the theoretically expected signs particularly in the long run. This implies that 
increase in interest rate by 1 percent causes informal sector to decrease by 13 percent in the long run while it 
leads to an increase of 3.4 percent in the short run. However, interest rate was not statistically significant both at 
long run and short run as shown by its t-values of -0.48 and 0.30 respectively. This result implies that interest 
rate is not among the significant causes of informal sector activities in Nigeria.  
11.3 Tax Burden  
Tax burden have a statistically significant influence on informal sector and its estimated coefficients have the 
theoretically expected signs.  The coefficients both at long and short run are 1.255 and 0.0553 respectively; 
while its t-values are 3.20 and 0.50 respectively. These results indicate that tax burden is a major cause of 
informal sector activities in Nigeria. This finding also validates majority of studies that pointed to a rise in tax 
burden as one of the most important causes of the increase in the informal economy (see Oduh et al, 2008; 
Salisu, 2001; Schneider (2007); Loayza, 1997; etc).  
11.4 Real Government Consumption 
Real Government Consumption expenditure was introduced as a proxy for all public sector activities. The results 
at long run and short long run displayed the coefficients of 0.193 and 0.0051 respectively. An increase in Real 
Government Consumption by 1 percent causes the informal sector of the economy to increase by 19 percent in 
the long run while it leads to an increase of 0.51 percent in the short run. The a priori findings of Oduh et al 
(2008) and Schneider (2007) are in conformity with this study. Real Government Consumption was highly 
statistically significant in the long run with t-value of 12.43, while its short run t-value of 0.17 was not significant. 
An increase of the informal economy can lead to reduced government revenues which in turn can reduce the 
quality and quantity of publicly provided goods and services (such as the public infrastructure). Ultimately, this 
can lead to an increase in the tax rates for firms and individuals in the formal sector of the economy. When this 
situation is combined with deterioration in the quality of the administration, a stronger incentive to participate in 
the informal economy emerges. Johnson et al (1998) presented a simple model of this relationship. Their 
findings show that smaller informal economies appear in countries with higher tax revenues, if achieved by 
lower tax rates, fewer laws and regulations, and less bribery facing enterprises. Countries with a better rule of the 
law, which is financed by tax revenues, also have smaller informal economies.  
11.5 Unemployment 
The unemployment variable has -3.021 and 0.1542 as its long run and short run coefficients respectively. Hence, 
the overall long run effect is negative. That is, the income effect exceeds the substitution effect. This finding is in 
conformity with Buehn and Schneider (2008), and it is supported by the positive relation between the informal 
economy and official GDP, suggesting that in the long run the two are complements rather than substitutes. As 
expected, however, the short run relationship is positive, which implies that people who face unemployment 
switch to the informal economy thereby negatively affecting official GDP. The short run result is theoretically 
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appealing and conforms to Oduh et al (2008), which indicated a direct relationship between unemployment and 
the informal sector.  
Even though its short run t-value of 0.51 is not statistically significant, unemployment is statistically significant 
going by its t-value of -6.70 in the long run. It also has the largest estimated coefficient, which further reinforces 
its importance as a causal variable. We therefore conclude that unemployment is another major cause of informal 
sector in Nigeria. According to Oduh et al (2008), one important implication of the above results is that increase 
in the size of the informal economy following increased labour supply is an indication that resources have shifted 
from the formal to the informal sector. This displacement effect will tend to shrink the growth rate of the official 
economy and reinforce unemployment. The economy will then experience an unemployment trap – transfer of 
labour resources from the formal to the informal economy and subsequent decrease in output of the formal sector 
and a decrease in formal economy labour demand. As such, the resources transfer will slow down output growth 
in the official economy. 
 
12. Overall Model Fit: 
The robust findings of this study are coherent with the model’s prescriptions. Nearly all the determinants of the 
informal sector used directly as explanatory variables present the expected sign, and are individually significant. 
Moreover, they are also jointly significant (the p-value of the F-statistic is 0.0000).  
The parsimonious specification and the size of the coefficient of determination (R
2
) are quite impressive. The R
2
 
of 0.983 for the long run model shows that the explanatory variables (Inflation, Interest rate, Unemployment, 
Tax burden and Real Government Consumption) adequately explained about 98% of the total variations in the 
latent variable (i.e. the size of the informal sector of the Nigerian economy).  
The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is also a fit test that Vuletin (2008) says is less sensitive 
to sample size than the above mentioned tests. The RMSEA-value varies between 0.0 and 1.0; and by 
convention, there is good model fit if the RMSEA is less than or equal to 0.05. Our results show that RMSEA for 
both the long run and short run MIMIC models is 0.0000, which indicates an overall good model fit.  
The P-value for test of close fit (RMSEA < 0.05) has the values of 0.0161 and 0.0000 for the long run and short 
run models respectively. Apart from having the desired positive (+) sign, they are also less than 0.05, giving the 
indication of a good model fit. We therefore conclude that overall, the various test statistics point to a close fit. 
 
13. Estimation of the Size of the Informal Sector 
Both the long run equilibrium relationship and the short run dynamic error correction representation of the 
MIMIC model represent our error correction MIMIC (EMIMIC) model. With it, we can now estimate the size 
and development of Nigeria’s informal economy. In the first step, we normalized the estimated coefficients to 
sum up to unity in line with Salisu (2001). Thereafter, the normalized coefficients of the fitted structural model 
were used to create an index for the informal sector. Lastly, we used the index for calibration of the size of the 
informal sector as percentage of the official GDP while correcting for deviations from equilibrium in the short 
run. 
In our calibration, we followed Oduh et al (2008) and adopted 2002 as our base period. According to Oduh et al 
(2008), they chose 2002 as their base year because it was the year of the most recent country-wide study of the 
informal sector in Nigeria. We also adopted the calibration benchmark of 57.9% obtained by Oduh et al (2008) 
for 2002. Our decision to adopt this benchmark is also reinforced by the fact that it is approximately equal to the 
average of the estimates obtained by Oduh et al (2008) for the period 1970 to 2005, which is 58.2%. Besides, 
Oduh et al (2008) is the first detailed estimation of Nigeria’s informal sector using an indirect approach that is 
consistent with time-series econometrics. Hence, we calibrated the size of the informal sector in Nigeria as: 
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 Inft = calibration benchmark *  fitted value of latent variablet                                                       ….(10) 
                            fitted value of latent variable2002 
 
where t = 1970, 1971, . . ., 2010. Apart from Oduh et al (2008), other studies that followed this calibration 
procedure include Buehn and Schneider (2008), Salisu (2001), Schneider (2008), etc. Based on our model, we 
estimated the size of Nigeria’s informal sector from 1970 to 2010 as shown in Table 5 below: 
Table 5: EMIMIC Model Estimates of the Size of the Nigerian Informal Economy: 




% GDP (EMIMIC) 
1970 5,281.10 4,075.35 77.17 
1971 6,650.90 4,972.17 74.76 
1972 7,187.50 5,308.03 73.85 
1973 8,630.50 6,434.20 74.55 
1974 18,823.10 11,959.99 63.54 
1975 21,475.24 13,732.87 63.95 
1976 26,655.78 16,228.50 60.88 
1977 31,520.34 17,312.98 54.93 
1978 34,540.10 19,143.86 55.43 
1979 41,974.70 29,351.12 69.93 
1980 49,632.32 33,607.34 67.71 
1981 47,619.66 25,909.77 54.41 
1982 49,069.28 30,781.63 62.73 
1983 53,107.38 29,190.66 54.97 
1984 59,622.53 33,049.14 55.43 
1985 67,908.55 46,442.40 68.39 
1986 69,146.99 46,732.79 67.58 
1987 105,222.84 69,526.24 66.08 
1988 139,085.30 92,070.19 66.20 
1989 216,797.54 137,660.83 63.50 
1990 267,549.99 168,877.67 63.12 
1991 312,139.74 183,919.50 58.92 
1992 532,613.83 352,738.95 66.23 
1993 683,869.79 461,909.15 67.54 
1994 899,863.22 628,130.97 69.80 
1995 1,933,211.55 1,143,301.18 59.14 
1996 2,702,719.13 1,503,851.71 55.64 
1997 2,801,972.58 1,502,366.39 53.62 
1998 2,708,430.86 1,709,562.76 63.12 
1999 3,194,014.97 2,262,169.23 70.83 
2000 4,582,127.29 3,070,258.46 67.01 
2001 4,725,086.00 2,994,845.78 63.38 
2002 6,912,381.25 4,002,268.74 57.90 
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2003 8,487,031.57 6,144,530.90 72.40 
2004 11,411,066.91 8,339,813.59 73.09 
2005 14,572,239.12 8,152,872.75 55.95 
2006 18,564,594.73 11,330,817.07 61.03 
2007 20,657,317.67 12,836,653.50 62.14 
2008 24,296,329.29 17,922,719.98 73.77 
2009 24,794,238.66 16,359,892.25 65.98 
2010 29,205,782.96 20,788,612.34 71.18 
Source: * CBN 2010 Statistical Bulletin; ** Own computations by the author 
 
The findings indicate that from 1970 to 2010, the size of Nigeria’s informal economy hovered between 53.6 – 
77.2% of official GDP, while the average size was 64.6% of GDP. In particular, our estimates show that the 
informal sector was about 71.2% of official GDP in 2010. These results are comparable to previous research 
evidence on the Nigerian informal sector. However, this study has the benefit of a more comprehensive data as 
well as the most recent technique of EMIMIC modeling developed by Buehn and Schneider (2008). 
Our results as shown in Table 5 above also show that the informal sector constitutes a very large proportion of 
the economy and contributes significantly to employment and the growth of gross domestic product in Nigeria. 
For over three decades, the informal sector in Nigeria has been an expanding source of employment especially 
for a large number of literate and non-literate populations who are unable to access employment in the formal 
sector. The informal sector, which has wide range of economic activities, operates below officialdom and outside 
the ambient of public institutions and regulations. According to Ishola (2008), the sub-sector accounts for about 
70% of the total industrial employment. Instead of working partly in the official sector and offering additional 
services underground as in high-income countries, enterprises in Nigeria completely engage in informal 
activities. Examples of such enterprises operating completely underground are restaurants, farms, bars, 
haircutters, and even big production and service companies (see Table 6 below). 













Size between 1 and 10 
people 
200 100% - - 200 
Largely Unregistered 130 65% 70 35% 200 
Ownership Legally 
independent  
170 85% 30 15% 200 
Labour-intensive 200 100% - - 200 
Sourced capital 
personally 
200 100% - - 200 
Mostly commodity 
trading 
96 42% 104 58% 200 
Sourced: Entrepreurship Development Centre, Lagos 
 
As indicated above, businesses owned can be structurally classified as largely informal on the dimension of size, 
regulation, legal framework, ownership, sources of capital and labour.  
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14. EMIMIC Estimates vs. Long Run Equilibrium  
Table 7 below compares our EMIMIC estimates with those of the long run equilibrium relationship and 
illustrates the deviations from long run equilibrium. Unlike previous studies, our approach used the long run 
equilibrium estimation for the initial calculation of the informal sector time series index. The calibration 
methodology is then used to correct for deviations from equilibrium in the short run. Previous studies, on the 
other hand, simply derive the index of the informal economy from their DYMIMIC estimates using some type of 
calibration methodology. Our EMIMIC model thus estimates the size and development of the informal economy 
more precisely.  
Table 7: EMIMIC vs. Long Run Equilibrium (% of Official GDP): 
YEAR 
EMIMIC 








1970 77.17 77.52 -0.35 
1971 74.76 74.26 0.50 
1972 73.85 74.21 -0.36 
1973 74.55 74.32 0.23 
1974 63.54 63.71 -0.17 
1975 63.95 64.44 -0.50 
1976 60.88 60.31 0.57 
1977 54.93 54.31 0.61 
1978 55.43 55.53 -0.11 
1979 69.93 69.11 0.82 
1980 67.71 67.26 0.45 
1981 54.41 54.12 0.29 
1982 62.73 61.75 0.98 
1983 54.97 55.66 -0.69 
1984 55.43 55.48 -0.05 
1985 68.39 68.79 -0.40 
1986 67.58 68.21 -0.62 
1987 66.08 65.84 0.23 
1988 66.20 66.20 -0.01 
1989 63.50 63.21 0.29 
1990 63.12 63.12 0.00 
1991 58.92 58.48 0.45 
1992 66.23 66.16 0.07 
1993 67.54 67.48 0.07 
1994 69.80 69.10 0.71 
1995 59.14 59.98 -0.84 
1996 55.64 55.56 0.09 
1997 53.62 53.73 -0.11 
1998 63.12 62.73 0.39 
1999 70.83 70.60 0.23 
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2000 67.01 66.53 0.47 
2001 63.38 63.25 0.14 
2002 57.90 57.90 0.00 
2003 72.40 71.51 0.89 
2004 73.09 72.31 0.77 
2005 55.95 56.92 -0.97 
2006 61.03 60.98 0.06 
2007 62.14 62.03 0.11 
2008 73.77 74.20 -0.43 
2009 65.98 65.81 0.18 
2010 71.18 72.05 -0.87 
Source: Own calculations by the author 
15. Trends in the Nigerian Informal Sector:  
 
Source: Own graph 
 
The trend in Nigerian informal sector as shown by our results is captured in Fig. 1 above. This figure is in 
conformity with the observation of Oduh et al (2008) that the changing structure of the Nigerian informal sector 
is characterized by two transitional periods namely, enforcement and institutional periods. Here, the enforcement 
factor deals with the public sector or state activities, in terms of choice of economic policy and policy 
enforcement. On the other hand, the institutional factor is concerned with political transition from one regime to 
another. 
Recent upsurge in the regulatory activities of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) after Sanusi Lamido Sanusi 
assumed office as the governor of the apex bank in June 2009 has two major implications that lead to upward 
trend in the size of informal sector. Thousands of bank employees who lost their jobs as a result of the CBN 














































































































Fig 1: Trends in Nigerian Informal Sector Size
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can no longer access credits from the banking system now resort to informal financial institutions to fund their 
operations. Our analysis indicates an increase in informal activities by 5.2% in the period 2009 – 2010. 
Furthermore, National Agency for Food Drug Regulation and Control (NAFDAC) regulation also has important 
implications for the size of the informal sector. Theoretically, increased enforcement amidst high incidence of 
poverty could bring about net increase in informal activities. This probably accounted for increase in the size of 
the informal sector despite increase in the rate of enforcement. This scenario was as a result of poverty rate 
offsetting the enforcement rate. The size of the informal sector increased by 15.2% between 2002 and 2004. 
Oduh et al (2008) also noted that the upsurge in the informal sector during this period can be partly attributed to 
the liberalization of the communication sector which increased the number of call centres in Nigeria. 
According to Oduh et al (2008), the political transitional points are characterized by what could be termed 
“regime break points”, that is, between “hand-over” and “take-over” periods. Examination of trends in the size of 
informal sector suggests changes between political transition periods. The periods between 1978 – 1979, 1983 – 
1985, and 1998 – 1999 witnessed a dramatic increase in the informal economy by 14.5%, 13.4% and 7.7% 
respectively. These were three different political transition points marking the change from one regime to 
another in Nigeria. The period 1998 – 1999 particularly witnessed the demise of former Head of State, General 
Sani Abacha and the emergence of General Abdulsalami Abubakar who subsequently commenced a transition to 
civil rule program. Hence, the Nigerian informal sector can be said to be transitional variant, that is, the informal 
economy in Nigeria has two determinant factors, economic factors and socio-political factors which are 
dependent on democratic forces. The interpretation is that during transitional points, informal activities tend to 
change depending on the perception of the operators about the incoming regime and changes in economic 
policies instituted by the incoming regime. 
 
The Structural Adjustment Period which was an experiment period slowed down informal activities temporarily. 
There was an attempt to encourage small and medium scale enterprises. This policy relaxed state activities in 
terms of formal regulation. The period between 1986 and 1990 witnessed a relative stability in the size of the 
informal economy which averaged at 65.3%. This result is in conformity with Oduh et al (2008). 
According to results, the post-war period of 1970 – 1975 witnessed a remarkable decline in the size of the 
Nigerian informal sector by about 13.2%. This period tends to be characterized by rapid picking up of economic 
activities and integration of the war torn areas into the formal economy. Increased government expenditure 
towards rebuilding the nation in the aftermath of the civil war also contributed towards increased activities in the 
formal sector to the detriment of the informal sector. This result is contrary to Oduh et al (2008) and Salisu 
(2001) that reported rapid increase of the informal economy within this period. However, Oduh et al (2008) 
found that the second national development plan implemented within this period contributed to the decline in the 
size of the informal economy in 1975 by 5%. 
Generally, our results show that the size of the informal economy hovered around an average of about 65% of 
the official GDP. This is easily seen from the thick trend line in Fig. 1 above. 
16. Conclusions: 
The main objective of this study as earlier stated is to examine the size, development, and causes of the informal 
sector of the Nigerian economy. We utilized the methodology of the EMIMIC model developed by Buehn and 
Schneider (2008) which better quantifies the size of the informal economy because it considers both the long run 
equilibrium relationships and the short run dynamic error corrections at the same time.  
We find that since 1970, the size of the informal economy has hovered between 53.6 – 77.2% of GDP. Also, our 
estimates show that the average size of the informal economy was about 64.6% of GDP. Specifically, our 
analysis indicates that informal sector was three-quarters of GDP in 2010. Furthermore, our results support a 
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direct relationship between increasing unemployment and the size of the informal sector. Other important drivers 
of the informal sector as shown by our results are increased burden of taxation, increased government regulation 
of economic activities and inflation. Finally, our findings indicate that interest rate is not a key driver of 
informality in Nigeria. 
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